Bargaining and the Timing of Investment
建立模型研究投资时机与工资谈判的联合决定，比较了有约束合同与无约束合同两种情形，发现无约束合同下投资可能更早且帕累托更优，结论取决于参与者的贴现因子。
ABSTRACT: The joint determination of the timing of investment and wage bargaining is modelled. Two cases are considered: (a) There is an alternating-offer bargaining game over binding wage contracts and production is possible only when agreement is reached. (b) There are no binding contracts so revenue is divided in period-by-period bargaining post-investment. Investment can occur earlier in case (b) than in case (a) and the equilibrium in case (b) can Pareto dominate the equilibrium with binding contracts. These conclusions depend on players ' discount factors.