Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests
利用205家瑞典公司数据，建立现金拍卖破产模型，发现资产回售给管理层是常见结果，且当市场流动性差时，回售可避免无效清算，但可能损害其他债权人利益。
I develop and estimate a model of cash auction bankruptcy using data on 205 Swedish firms. The results challenge arguments that cash auctions, as compared to reorganizations, are immune to conflicts of interest between claimholders but lead to inefficient liquidations. I show that a sale of the assets back to incumbent management is a common bankruptcy outcome. Sale‐backs are more likely when they favor the bank at the expense of other creditors. On the other hand, inefficient liquidations are frequently avoided through sale‐backs when markets are illiquid, that is, when industry indebtedness is high and the firm has few nonspecific assets.