Ramsey pricing and supply-side incentives in physician markets
提出在医生能创造边际需求且价格受监管高于边际成本时，最优定价应基于服务对需求创造的敏感度，类似拉姆齐定价以最小化过度供给的无谓损失。
In this paper, I develop a theory of optimal prices using a relative value scale where there are fixed costs of medical practice. I consider a regulator constrained to set prices in excess of marginal cost, in markets where physicians can create demand at the margin. Under these conditions, basing prices on physician costs alone is shown to be suboptimal. Instead, prices should anticipate the behavior of physicians by setting profit margins highest for services least susceptible to demand creation. This is equivalent to a form of Ramsey pricing, used in this case to minimize the deadweight loss of oversupply.