Spillover Effects in Subjective Performance Evaluation: Bias and the Asymmetric Influence of Controllability
实验发现，主管在评价下属行政绩效时，会受其销售业绩客观指标的影响，且当不可控因素导致销售下降时会补偿下属，但销售上升时不会惩罚，体现了非对称的可控性效应。
ABSTRACT We examine how subjective performance evaluations are influenced by the level and controllability of an accompanying measure of a separate performance dimension. In our experiment, supervisors evaluate the office administration performance of a hypothetical subordinate. We find that supervisors' subjective evaluations are directionally influenced by an accompanying objective measure of sales performance, even after excluding participants who perceive informativeness across measures. Consistent with concerns for fairness and motivation, we also find an asymmetric uncontrollability effect—supervisors' evaluations are higher when an uncontrollable factor decreases the subordinate's sales (i.e., they compensate for bad luck), but are not lower when the uncontrollable factor increases the subordinate's sales (i.e., they do not punish for good luck). This evidence suggests that supervisors use discretion provided to evaluate performance on one task to adjust for perceived deficiencies in the evaluation of performance on other tasks. Our study integrates theories of cognitive bias and motivation, highlighting the need to consider the potentially interactive effects of different performance measures in multi-task settings.