Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis
分析古诺寡头市场中横向合并的均衡效应，发现任何不产生协同效应的合并都会提高价格，并给出合并提高福利的充分条件，指出传统赫芬达尔指数分析可能误导。
The authors analyze horizontal mergers in Cournot oligopoly. They find general conditions under which such mergers raise price, and show that any merger not creating synergies raises price. The authors develop a procedure for analyzing the effect of a merger on rivals and consumers and, thus, provide sufficient conditions for profitable mergers to raise welfare. They show that traditional merger analysis can be misleading in its use of the Herfindahl Index. Their analysis stresses the output responses of large firms not participating in the merger. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.