U.S. Trade Policy on Lamb Meat: Who Gets Fleeced?
用局部均衡模型分析美国1999年对羊肉进口的关税配额保护，发现不同政策下包装商和养殖户的福利变化不同：关税下双方受益，配额下养殖户可能受损。
Abstract The U.S. lamb meat industry received protection from import competition in 1999 with a tariff‐rate quota. This paper analyzes proposed and adopted policies using a partial equilibrium model of lamb meat and lambs incorporating imperfect competition in the packing industry. Under a tariff policy packers can only exercise oligopsony power in the lamb market and both packers and lamb growers benefit from protection. If a quota or tariff‐rate quota policy is used, packers can assert oligopoly power. Packers benefit from protection, but lamb growers may not. Under the tariff‐rate quota adopted, lamb growers suffer a welfare loss.