Generalized contest success functions
将竞赛成功函数的公理化从单一投资类型推广到多种投资类型，为Skaperdas（1996）和Clark与Riis（1998）的结果提供统一框架，并解释了一些看似特设的竞赛成功函数。
The key element of models of contest is the contest success function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified framework to extend and interpret the results of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283–290, 1996) and Clark and Riis (Econ Theory 11:201–204, 1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used by applied researchers.