OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, WITH HUMAN CAPITAL DEPRECIATION, AND DURATION DEPENDENCE*
在标准最优失业保险框架中引入失业期间工作机会恶化的可能性，刻画了有效保险方案，发现最优方案包含最低援助水平和长期失业者工资补贴，基于西班牙和美国经济的数值模拟支持这些措施。
This article introduces the possibility of a deterioration in job opportunities during unemployment into the standard optimal unemployment insurance (UI) design framework and characterizes the efficient UI scheme. The optimal program may display two novel features, which cannot be present in stationary models. First, UI transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient contract. Second, the optimal scheme implies a wage subsidy for long‐term unemployed workers. Numerical simulations based on the Spanish and U.S. economies suggest that both assistance transfers and wage subsidies should be part of the UI scheme in these countries.