Shareholder‐ Versus Stakeholder‐Focused Japanese Companies: Firm Characteristics and Accounting Valuation*
研究日本企业在美国上市（股东导向）与未在美国上市（利益相关者导向）的差异，发现前者会计信息对市场价值的解释力更强，且不受会计准则差异影响。
Abstract Recent research has found that the value‐relevance of accounting variables depends not only on whether a country's accounting rules are code‐law oriented or common‐law oriented, but also on the reporting incentives created by the legal and business environment in which a firm operates. Therefore, for example, the earnings of firms in some countries with common‐law oriented rules but with code‐law incentives have more code‐law‐type characteristics. We further this research by examining whether this is true for firms facing the same accounting regime and institutional environment but different stakeholder‐related incentives. We find significant stakeholder‐related incentives across 23 Japanese firms listed in the United States and 23 Japanese firms not listed in the United States that are matched by industry and size. Although these firms face the same institutional environment and the same accounting regime, consistent with the differences in stakeholder‐related incentives, the earnings and book values of the firms listed in the more shareholder‐oriented U.S. markets have significantly more explanatory power for market value than those for firms not cross‐listed in the United States. These findings are unaffected by whether the reports are based on consolidated or parent‐only accounting or whether they are based on U.S. or Japanese GAAP, emphasizing the potential influence of reporting incentives at all levels on the effect of standardization, conversion, or harmonization of accounting methods globally.