Cui Bono? The Selective Revealing of Knowledge and Its Implications for Innovative Activity
研究了企业如何通过选择性揭示知识来重塑创新生态系统中其他参与者的合作行为，并分析了这种策略在特定条件下的有效性及其对创新理论和管理实践的启示。
Current theories of how organizations harness knowledge for innovative activity cannot convincingly explain emergent practices whereby firms selectively reveal knowledge to their advantage. We conceive selective revealing as a strategic mechanism to re-shape the collaborative behavior of other actors in the innovation ecosystem. We propose that selective revealing may provide a more effective alternative to known collaboration mechanisms in particular under conditions of high partner uncertainty, high coordination costs, and unwilling potential collaborators. We specify conditions when firms are more likely to reveal knowledge and highlight some boundary conditions for competitor reciprocity. We elaborate upon strategies that allow firms to exhibit managerial agency in selective revealing, and discuss its implications for theories of innovation and management practice.