Segmentation, collateral undervaluation, and the rate of interest in agrarian credit markets: some evidence from two villages in South India
基于南印度两个村庄的信贷交易数据，研究了农业信贷市场中正规与非正规部门的分割基础，发现抵押品类型和贷款目的导致市场分割，且抵押品可销售性越低、低估程度越高，贷款利率越高；同时借款人土地价值与利率呈负相关。
This paper examines certain issues pertaining to the structure of agrarian credit markets in developing countries using empirical evidence on credit transactions from two villages in south India. First, the bases for the segmentation between formal and informal sectors of the credit market are identified as being: (1) the type of collateral offered on credit contracts, and (2) the purpose for which credit is taken. Secondly, the paper shows the occurrence of a systematic association between rates of interest and types of collateral. The evidence supports the hypothesis that lower marketability of collateral security, and hence higher undervaluation, increases the rate of interest charged on a loan. Thirdly, the evidence shows an inverse relationship between the value of land owned by a borrower and the rate of interest on a credit contract. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.