Incentives Management During Privatization: An Agency Perspective
通过实地研究，从代理视角解释了私有化后企业如何改变监督和激励对齐机制以支持新所有权利益，发现私有化前后激励管理的差异源于不同的代理关系，且监督与激励对齐机制的关系复杂而非简单替代。
abstract This paper explains, through a field study and from an agency perspective, how monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms change to support the interests of a privatized firm's new ownership. In this case, privatization led to important changes in the board of directors and to more formal performance evaluation and compensation systems for top managers, as profitability and financial control gained relevancy with the firm ownership change. Our results show that differences in incentives management before and after privatization are due to different agency relations in the two periods. We also argue that in a privatization framework the relation between monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms is complex, not simply substitutive as agency theory would predict, and this finding allows us to refine and extend agency theory for this specific context.