Failed takeover attempts, corporate governance and refocusing
研究了76家遭遇敌意收购失败的公司，发现独立董事管理的公司倾向于忽视收购信号而不调整战略，而非独立董事管理的公司则更可能将失败视为警钟并重新聚焦战略。
Abstract Hostile takeover attempts oftentimes signal that a target firm has an over‐diversified and ineffective corporate strategy. What does this signal mean when takeover attempts fail? Drawing from agency theory, we argue that target firms managed by independent directory boards are likely to ignore the takeover attempt and not refocus their firms' strategy. Conversely, target firms managed by nonindependent boards are more likely to view the failed takeover attempt as a ‘wake‐up call’ and will refocus their firms' strategy so as to preserve the firm's survival. These arguments are tested using a sample of 76 firms that were targets of failed hostile takeover attempts. Logistic regression analyses confirm the predictions. This study suggests that in the aftermath of a failed takeover attempt board of director characteristics can help predict changes in corporate strategies. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.