An‐arrgh‐chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization
研究海盗如何通过制衡机制和民主宪法来防止内部掠夺、减少冲突并最大化利润，揭示了暴力犯罪企业的内部治理制度。
This article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of pirates. To effectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict, and maximize piratical profit. Pirates devised two institutions for this purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order. Pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history. (c) 2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.