Origination Channel, Prepayment Penalties and Default
研究发现非银行机构发放的次级抵押贷款违约率更高，但仅针对含提前还款罚金的贷款；非银行对罚金定价更不利，且更多向金融素养低的借款人发放此类贷款，而限制罚金的州法律能消除这一差异。
This article presents evidence that nonbank‐originated subprime mortgages have a higher probability of default than bank‐originated subprime mortgages, but only for loans with prepayment penalties. Evidence also indicates that nonbanks price prepayment penalties less favorably to borrowers than banks do, and nonbanks originate disproportionately more loans with prepayment penalties in locales with less financially sophisticated borrowers. State antipredatory lending law provisions restricting the use of prepayment penalties eliminate the elevated default risk of nonbank originations relative to bank originations. These findings are consistent with incentives generated by nonbank compensation via yield spread premiums on loans with prepayment penalties.