LIQUIDITY, MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION, AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*
在银行负债作为交换媒介的模型中，研究最优银行行为及央行监管对流动性供给的影响，发现银行回报低时会出现倒闭，央行干预可降低倒闭率并改善福利。
We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.