Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities
分析地方政府与承包商之间的公共设施管理合同设计，政府掌握设施质量信息，承包商付出不可验证的努力，合同设计通过政府承担风险比例来传递质量信号，并探讨了风险厌恶、双重道德风险和政治委托等扩展。
We analyze the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf. Governments are privately informed about the quality of the facility, while risk-neutral contractors undertake a nonverifiable operating effort. The design of the contract signals the quality of the facility in such a way that the better this quality, the greater the share of operating risk kept by the government. This feature reduces the agent's marginal incentives, creating a tradeoff between signalling and moral hazard. We provide extensions of our framework in several directions, allowing for risk aversion on the agent's side, double moral hazard, and political delegation. The model is supported by some stylized facts from the water industry.