Uniform Commercial Policy, Illegal Trade, and the Real Exchange Rate: A Theoretical Analysis
研究了固定汇率国家使用统一关税与补贴方案实现实际贬值的效果，发现该方案相比全面贬值会激励非法贸易并降低福利，甚至可能导致实际汇率升值。
Countries on fixed exchange rates sometimes use uniform tariff cum subsidy (UTCS) schemes as a way of achieving a real depreciation without disturbing the nominal exchange rate. A potential drawback of this policy in relation to an across-the-board devaluation is that a UTCS scheme provides incentives for illegal trade. Using an optimizing model with currency convertibility and illegal trade, I find that welfare is lower under a UTCS scheme than under a corresponding across-the-board devaluation and that in some cases the real exchange rate actually appreciates in response to an increase in the UTCS rate.