Some Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Discrimination, Co‐Operation and Perceptions of Fairness
通过鹰鸽博弈实验，发现随机分配颜色标签会演化出歧视性惯例，受歧视者更倾向于相互合作，而优势方则不然，并基于修改的Rabin模型解释这一现象。
When two people agree to trade, they unlock a mutual benefit, resolve a potential conflict and gain in proportion to their relative 'aggression', eg the Hawk–Dove game. In an experiment with this game, a discriminatory convention evolved when half of the players were randomly assigned a red and the other half a blue label. Later, the same players were also offered the option of co‐operating. Those disadvantaged by the colour‐based discriminatory convention co‐operated with one another most of the time while the rest did not. The paper offers an explanation of these observations based on a modification of Rabin (1993). The weaker are always anxious for justice and equality. The strong pay heed to neither. (Aristotle, Politics, s1318b)