An Empirical Model of the Medical Match
利用观察到的匹配数据估计医学生与医院双方的偏好，通过反事实模拟分析反垄断指控，发现集中匹配并非导致住院医师薪资低于边际产出的主要原因。
This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries.