Corporate Pension Plans as Takeover Deterrents
利用英国数据发现，设立固定收益养老金计划的企业更不易成为收购目标，即使被尝试收购也更难成功，原因是养老金负债价值的不确定性增加了收购方的风险。
Abstract We use UK data to show that firms that sponsor a defined-benefit pension plan are less likely to be targeted in an acquisition and, conditional on an attempted takeover, they are less likely to be acquired. Our explanation is that the uncertainty in the value of pension liabilities is a source of risk for acquirers of the firm's shares, which works as a takeover deterrent. In support of this explanation we find that these same firms are more likely to use cash when acquiring other firms, and that the announcement of a cash acquisition is associated with positive announcement effects.