Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class‐Action Securities Litigation
研究公司高管被指控欺诈时是否遭受声誉惩罚，发现多数情况下董事职位反而增加，仅在高额和解或SEC介入时才出现声誉损失，质疑证券集体诉讼的价值。
If private securities class actions alleging fraudulent behavior by officers or directors of a company are meritorious, directors and officers should pay a reputational penalty when they sit on a board of a company whose officers and directors are accused of fraud. I find little evidence of a negative effect associated with allegations of fraud. Using various definitions of board positions as a proxy for the reputation of directors who are accused of fraud, I find that the net number of board positions is consistently increased. Only in shareholder class actions in the top quartile of settlements or in which the Securities and Exchange Commission has initiated a case do directors appear to suffer a reputational penalty when a board they serve on is accused of fraud. The results call into question the merits of private securities class actions.