Distinguishing Limited Liability from Moral Hazard in a Model of Entrepreneurship
构建并估计一个模型，区分金融市场的有限责任与道德风险对创业选择的影响，利用泰国农村和半城市家庭数据，发现道德风险是信贷市场不完美的主要来源。
We present and estimate a model in which the choice between entrepreneurship and wage work may be influenced by financial market imperfections. The model allows for limited liability, moral hazard, and a combination of both constraints. The paper uses structural techniques to estimate the model and identify the source of financial market imperfections using data from rural and semiurban households in Thailand. Structural, nonparametric, and reduced-form estimates provide independent evidence that the dominant source of credit market imperfections is moral hazard. We reject the hypothesis that limited liability alone can explain the data.