风险下营销合同的供给与需求

The Supply and Demand of Marketing Contracts under Risk

American Journal of Agricultural Economics · 1981
被引 10
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

运用伯努利决策理论分析企业签订营销合同的意愿,构建合同供需函数,探讨风险厌恶、定价条款等因素对合同交换的影响,并重点讨论成本加成和固定价格远期交割合同。

Abstract

Abstract Bernoullian decision theory is used to characterize a firm's willingness to purchase or sell a good under contract. Contract supply and demand functions are then specified in which willingness to contract is related to contract‐pricing provisions, to decision maker risk aversion, to open market opportunities, and to other factors. On the basis of these relations, a theory of exchange is proposed which incorporates decision making under risk. Implications of the analysis differ by contract type; cost‐plus and fixed‐price forward deliverable contracts are emphasized.

营销合同风险决策风险规避合同定价