Economics of Direct Legislation
构建直接立法理论，解释为何有些议题由全民投票决定、有些由代表决定，以及公民为何参与或放弃投票。基于871项加州提案数据，发现“好政府”议题多由立法解决，分配议题多由倡议解决；代表不回应选民时公民立法更常见；分配性提案投票率更高，且投票参与随时间上升。
This paper develops a theory of direct legislation to explain (i) why some issues are resolved by popular vote and others by elected representatives, and (ii) why citizens vote on some ballot propositions and abstain on others. Evidence is provided by a new data set describing 871 California propositions. The main findings are the following. "Good government" issues were usually resolved by legislative measures and distributional issues by initiatives. Citizen-initiated legislation was more common when representatives were unresponsive to the electorate. Voter turnout was higher on distributional propositions than good government propositions. Voter participation on ballot measures has been increasing over time.