The Ratings Game: Asymmetry in Classification
研究发现美国电影协会的家长指导评级中，大制片厂和核心制片人、导演的电影更容易获得宽松评级，而独立发行商和边缘从业者则面临更严格的评级，导致市场劣势。
Categorization processes are generally treated as consistent mappings of the underlying characteristics that they group. Yet, in many cases, the identities of actors influence these processes. When identity matters, high-status actors often obtain more favorable classifications. We examine these processes in the context of the Motion Picture Association of America's parental guidance classifications of movies (G, PG, R, NC-17). We find that, conditional on a given level of content, films distributed by the Association's members and those that involve more central producers and directors receive more lenient classifications than those carried by independent distributors and involving more peripheral personnel. Conversely, and again conditional on content, films involving directors with a history of producing R-rated features receive more restrictive ratings. We discuss the mechanisms that might account for these effects. Regardless of the mechanism, however, because ratings influence revenue and consequently profitability, the movie certification system in the United States places independent distributors and peripheral individuals at a disadvantage, relative to their larger and more central rivals.