Seniority and Distribution in a Two-Worker Trade Union
提出一个简单模型，说明工会的资历解雇规则和资历工资曲线源于对企业的价格歧视，且即使禁止会员间现金转移，工会的分配偏好也不影响最优资历工资曲线。
Unlike existing models that rely heavily on assumptions regarding unions' distributional preferences, we present a simple model in which union seniority-layoff rules and rising seniority-wage profiles result from optimal price discrimination against the firm. Surprisingly, even when cash transfers among union members are ruled out, unions' optimal seniority-wage profiles are likely to be completely unaffected by their distributional preferences because of a kink in the utility-possibility frontier. This suggests that the simple technology of price discrimination may play a key role, hitherto unappreciated, in explaining union policies that affect the relative well-being of different union members.