Reassessing board member allegiance: CEO replacement following financial misconduct
研究发现，财务不当行为后，与CEO关系密切的董事（内部董事和CEO任命的董事）更可能减少对CEO的支持，从而增加CEO被更换的可能性，这与业绩不佳时的情形相反。
Research summary: We examine how board members' reactions following financial misconduct differ from those following other adverse organizational events, such as poor performance. We hypothesize that inside directors and directors appointed by the CEO may be particularly concerned about their reputation following deceptive financial practices. We demonstrate that directors more closely affiliated with the CEO are more likely to reduce their support for the CEO following financial misconduct, increasing the likelihood of CEO replacement. Enactment of the S arbanes‐ O xley A ct similarly alters governance dynamics by creating a greater expectation for sound corporate governance. We demonstrate our findings in U.S . public firms that restated their financial earnings during a 12‐year period before and after the passage of S arbanes‐ O xley . Managerial summary: Given past concerns about lack of oversight by boards of directors leading to firm financial misconduct, we examine how the relationship between directors and CEOs may be altered in the face of such misconduct. We argue that directors most closely tied to the CEO (inside board members and board members appointed by the CEO ), typically the most supportive of the CEO , may become most concerned about their own reputation following financial misconduct. We find that CEOs receive less support from these directors, a finding in contrast to past studies demonstrating that such board members tend to shield CEOs following poor performance. These findings are accentuated following the passage of the S arbanes‐ O xley A ct, which places greater responsibility on the CEO for the accuracy of financial reports . Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.