Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics
研究两党在再分配议题上的战略信息竞选，发现政党会针对不确定性大、选民流动性高且初始信息少的群体加强宣传，这些群体因此获得更多政策优待。
The article investigates strategic, informative campaigning by two parties when politics concern redistribution. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favour special groups. Parties will target campaigns on groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. In equilibrium, campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile, most likely to vote, most receptive to campaigns and relatively uninformed initially. These groups will become more informed about policy. Parties will therefore gain more votes by treating these groups well so these groups will gain from strategic campaigning. Welfare effects are assessed. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.