Highgrading in Quota‐Regulated Fisheries: Evidence from the Icelandic Cod Fishery
建立了一个包含非线性丢弃成本的模型，分析个体可转让配额制度下渔船的高选性丢弃行为，并以冰岛鳕鱼渔业为例进行实证检验，预测不同渔具类型的丢弃量。
Abstract A model with nonlinear discarding costs is developed for a fishery with an individual transferable quota (ITQ) program. The model shows that limited hold capacity and ITQs provide incentives to discard fish. The model is applied to the Icelandic ITQ‐regulated cod fishery to test for highgrading and to predict the discarded quantities of different grades of fish. The results indicate that vessels are involved in highgrading, but there is no evidence of quota price‐induced highgrading. The predicted total discarded quantities are 4.7% and 2.7% of total landings for gillnet and longline vessels, respectively. These correspond well with official biometric estimates.