Can Reporting Norms Create a Safe Harbor? Jury Verdicts against Auditors under Precise and Imprecise Accounting Standards
通过749名模拟陪审员的实验，研究在客户报告不变时，精确与不精确会计准则下陪审团对审计师的裁决差异，发现行业报告规范在不精确标准下为审计师提供安全港保护。
ABSTRACT We conduct an experiment with 749 mock jurors to examine whether juries evaluate auditors differently under precise versus imprecise standards when the client reporting is held constant. We find that the impact of standard precision on jury verdicts depends on the aggressiveness of the audit client's financial reports and on the industry reporting norm. When the client's reporting is more aggressive and violates the precise standard, juries return fewer verdicts against auditors under the imprecise standard, especially when the reporting complies with the industry norm. When the client's reporting is less aggressive and complies with the precise standard, juries return more verdicts against auditors under the imprecise standard, but only when the client's reporting is more aggressive than the industry norm. Compliance with industry reporting norms appears to provide auditors with safe harbor protection from negligence verdicts when accounting standards are imprecise.