管理式医疗与影子价格

Managed care and shadow price

Health Economics · 2003
被引 5
人大 A-

中文导读

研究了管理式医疗公司在多个服务项目和参保群体间分配资源以实现利润最大化的规则,发现均衡分配可通过影子价格解释,并由功利主义医生在群体预算约束下实施。

Abstract

A managed-care company must decide on allocating resources of many services to many groups of enrollees. The profit-maximizing allocation rule is characterized. For each group, the marginal utilities across all services are equalized. The equilibrium has an enrollee group shadow price interpretation. The equilibrium spending allocation can be implemented by letting utilitarian physicians decide on service spending on an enrollee group subject to a budget for the group.

管理式医疗影子价格资源配置利润最大化