Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices
研究卖家通过提供拍卖而非固定价格合同来竞争的大市场，分析了两种模型下的均衡拍卖组合及其效率性质，适合对拍卖市场设计感兴趣的学者。
In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud.55(1988), 71–84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (Econometrica61(1993), 1281–1312) in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D41, D44, D82.