Contracting Costs and Information Asymmetry Reduction in Cross-Border M&A
研究了并购中的签约成本，构建信息不对称理论模型，发现跨境交易中买方更常用机制降低信息不对称，这解释了跨境并购成本更高但执行更快的原因。
This paper explores the contracting costs of conducting mergers and acquisitions (M&A), creates a theoretical model of the information asymmetry involved, and shows how buying firms employ several mechanisms to reduce such asymmetry. Extending prior literature, the paper examines these costs in both domestic and cross-border settings using a sample of over 3000 M&A deals. I consider both the fees paid and the time required in the bargaining phase to be contracting costs, and model them simultaneously to help explicate their endogenous relationship. The results show that buyers in cross-border deals are more likely to employ mechanisms to affect information asymmetry, while the employment of these mechanisms affects contracting costs. The results help to explain why cross-border M&A are more costly yet more quickly executed. Finally, modelling the use and effects of the mechanisms is sufficient to explain the contracting cost differences between domestic and cross-border M&A.