Auctions Versus Negotiations
比较了无底价拍卖与最优谈判的盈利能力，发现当竞拍者信号独立时拍卖更优；信号关联时在特定条件下结论仍成立，表明额外竞争的价值高于谈判技巧。
Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? The authors show, under reasonable assumptions, that the auction is always preferable when bidders' signals are independent. For affiliated signals, the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller's choice of negotiating mechanism. The result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition. The paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory.