Information Gathering Externalities for a Multi‐Attribute Good
研究了垄断企业投资于两种质量属性的产品时，消费者选择获取不同属性信息会间接影响企业投资激励，导致信息收集的外部性，并可能降低消费者剩余、利润和福利。
Abstract Most goods and services vary in numerous dimensions. C ustomers choose to acquire information to assess some characteristics and not others. Their choices affect firms' incentives to invest in quality and so lead to indirect externalities in consumers' choices. We characterize a model in which a monopolist invests in the quality of a product with two characteristics, and consumers are heterogeneous ex‐ante . Consumers do not internalize their influence on the firm's investment incentives when choosing which information to acquire. Cheaper information affects consumers' information gathering and thereby firm investment. This can paradoxically reduce consumer surplus, profits, and welfare.