Performance Measure Manipulation*
分析了一个两期模型，其中沟通限制排除了通常的揭示表示，沟通政策表现为“收入平滑”。驱动因素是“平滑”或操纵序列相对于无法操纵时的信息含量。根据随机结构的不同，绩效指标操纵可能具有社会效率，也可能没有；当需要激励这种操纵时，最优政策本身可以采取多种形式。
Abstract A two‐period model in which communication restrictions preclude the usual revelation representation is analyzed, and the communication policies take on the appearance of “income smoothing.” The driving force is the information content of the “smoothed” or manipulated series, relative to its counterpart were manipulation not possible. Various possibilities arise, depending on the underlying stochastic structure: performance measure manipulation might be socially efficient, or not; and when it is best to invite and motivate this manipulation, the optimal policy itself can take on a variety of forms.