Fired or Retired? a Competing Risks Analysis of Chief Executive Turnover
用持续时间模型分析1996-2005年英国FTSE 350公司CEO的任期和离职方式，发现后期解雇概率更高，但任期超过五年后强制离职概率骤降，原因是CEO得以巩固职位。
We apply duration analysis to model the tenure and mode of exit of CEOs from FTSE 350 companies from 1996-2005, a decade in which corporate governance reforms have sought to increase the accountability of the CEO to shareholders and their representatives on the board. We find a greater likelihood of dismissal in the latter part of the period. However, we also find that the likelihood of forced departure sharply decreases from the fifth year of a CEO's tenure. We find evidence that this is because CEOs who survive beyond year four are able to entrench themselves in their position. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.