An Approach to Communication Equilibria
在纳什均衡基础上逐步扩展，提出多阶段博弈的扩展型相关均衡和沟通均衡，证明其收益集具有规范表示且为凸多面体，并构造了超规范博弈使收益集等于该博弈的纳什均衡收益集。
The Nash equilibrium concept may be extended gradually when the rules of the game are interpreted in a wider and wider sense, so as to allow preplay or even intraplay communication. A well-known extension of the Nash equilibrium is Aumann's correlated equilibrium, which depends only on the normal form of the game. Two other solution concepts for multistage games are proposed here: the extensive form correlated equilibrium, where the players can observe private extraneous signals at every stage and the communication equilibrium, where the players are furthermore allowed to transmit inputs to an appropriate device at every stage. We show that the set of payoffs associated with each solution concept has a canonical representation (in the spirit of the revelation principle) and is a convex polyhedron. We also provide for each concept a super-canonical game such that the set of payoffs associated with the solution concept is precisely the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of this game.