Estimating a Parsimonious Model of Inequality Aversion in Stackelberg Duopoly Experiments*
利用Huck等人(2001)的斯塔克尔伯格双寡头实验数据，通过最大似然方法检验发现，近40%的参与者存在显著的不利不平等厌恶，而有利不平等厌恶相对不重要，支持了更简约的不含有利不平等厌恶的模型。
In the Stackelberg duopoly experiments in Huck et al. (2001), nearly half of the followers' behaviours are inconsistent with conventional prediction. We use a test in which the conventional self-interested model is nested as a special case of an inequality aversion model. Maximum likelihood methods applied to the Huck et al. (2001) data set reject the self-interested model. We find that almost 40% of the players have disadvantageous inequality aversion that is statistically different from zero and economically significant, but advantageous inequality aversion is relatively unimportant. These estimates provide support for a more parsimonious model with no advantageous inequality aversion. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 2010.