Are Speculators Unwelcome in Multi-Object Auctions?
研究完全信息统一价格拍卖中，转售机会吸引无使用价值的投机者进入，高价值竞拍者可能故意让投机者赢标以压低拍卖价格，从而影响卖方收入。
I consider a uniform-price auction under complete information. The possibility of resale attracts speculators who have no use value for the objects on sale. A high-value bidder may strictly prefer to let a speculator win some of the objects and then buy in the resale market, in order to keep the auction price low. Although resale induces entry by speculators and therefore increases the number of competitors, high-value bidders' incentives to “reduce demand” are also affected. Allowing resale to attract speculators reduces the seller's revenue when bidders' valuations are dispersed. Speculators increase the seller's revenue only when they are outbid.