Warrant Exercise, Dividends, and Reinvestment Policy
研究认股权证持有者的顺序行使策略及囤积权证的收益，分析垄断或寡头持有者如何通过再投资政策获利，并指出寡头持有者可能获得更低的权证价值。
ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine sequential exercise strategies by warrantholders and the gain from hoarding warrants. We analyze several obstacles to acquiring large blocks in order to exploit sequential strategies. First, we identify several reinvestment policies for which sequential exercise is not advantageous, thereby eliminating the gain from hoarding. However, sequential exercise strategies may be advantageous for monopoly or oligopoly warrantholders, even absent dividends, because using exercise proceeds to repurchase stock or to expand the firm's scale increases the riskiness of an equity share. Second, oligopoly warrantholders can receive a smaller warrant value than perfectly competitive warrantholders, suggesting a potential cost to unsuccessful hoarding.