Wage-Employment Contracts
研究当企业控制就业水平时，关于工人收入与就业依赖关系的有效协议。企业掌握盈利状况的优越信息导致这种合同治理形式。在合理假设下，此类协议为减轻风险而偏离效率就业水平。若闲暇是正常品且企业风险中性，就业总是高于有效水平。因此，该单期隐性合同模型不能将失业解释为信息不对称下工人与风险中性企业风险分担的理性副产品。
This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms.The firms' .superiorinformation about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance.Under plausible assumptions, such aj^reements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk.ll is shown that, if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk-neutral, employment is always ahoue the efficient level.Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk-neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information.