The effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profits
研究了CEO薪酬相对于市场水平的高低如何影响CEO自愿离职、公司规模和利润，发现薪酬偏低会促使CEO离职和公司规模变化，且这种关系在所有者控制的企业中更强；薪酬偏高则与更高利润相关，但在管理者控制的企业中较弱。
Abstract We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner‐controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager‐controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.