Pricing Diagnostic Information
研究如何为诊断信息定价，这类信息能帮助买家更准确地预测投资项目的成功概率。作者发现，买家对信息的支付意愿与其先验成功概率呈非单调关系，最优定价方案是向低概率买家收取纯版税、向高概率买家收取纯固定费用。
Diagnostic information allows an agent to predict the state of nature about the success of an investment project better than the prior. We analyze the optimal pricing scheme for selling diagnostic information to buyers with different, privately known, ex ante success probability. Investment costs and returns of successful projects are assumed to be the same for all buyers. The value of diagnostic information is the difference in expected payoffs with and without it, and we show that the willingness to pay for diagnostic information is nonmonotonic in the ex ante success probability. When the information seller can offer only one quality level, and negative payments are not allowed, we find that the optimal menu of (linear) contracts is remarkably simple. A pure royalty is offered to buyers with low ex ante success probability, and a pure fixed fee is offered to buyers with high ex ante success probability.