Nutritional Efficiency Wages and Unemployment: Where's the Beef?
修改标准营养效率工资模型，考虑雇主可直接提供卡路里而非支付更高工资，分析不同交易成本假设下的理论结果，指出直接提供卡路里削弱了传统效率工资理论作为均衡失业原因的解释力。
Abstract We modify the standard nutritional efficiency wage model to allow for the fact that employers can directly provide calories to their workers rather than paying a higher wage to induce employees to spend more on their own caloric consumption. We derive the various theoretical outcomes that are possible depending on the assumptions about the transaction costs of directly providing calories. We argue that in most real‐world situations the ability of employers to directly provide calories undermines the traditional efficiency wage theory as a cause of equilibrium unemployment.