Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage
回顾了婚姻中的简单议价模型及相关实证证据，讨论了收入由丈夫或妻子控制对家庭行为的不同影响，以及这些模型对婚姻内部分配的启示。
The standard economic model of the family is a ‘common preference’ model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources. In recent years, this model has been challenged by game-theoretic models of marriage that do not impose ‘pooling’ and are, therefore, consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior. In this paper, the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence, and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage.