The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings
研究盈余管理是否影响盈余稳健性的度量，发现控制可操纵应计后，德国和法国等成文法国家在坏消息期间的盈余反应差异显著减小。
Abstract: Is earnings management affecting (driving) the measures of earnings conservatism? Ball et al. (2000) point out that the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings (faster recognition of bad news: earnings conservatism) is more pronounced in common‐law than in code‐law based accounting regimes. However, comparative studies on earnings conservatism in Europe have failed to identify significant differences between common‐law and code‐law based countries. We argue that in code‐law based countries managers have incentives to reduce earnings consistently. This enhances the association between earnings and returns in bad news periods. We find that after controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings response to bad news in Germany and France decreases significantly.