The Boundaries and Limitations of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory in the Venture Capitalist/Entrepreneur Relationship
分析了代理理论和管家理论在解释风险投资家与企业家关系行为时的局限性，指出各自理论解释力的潜在问题，并讨论了理论空白及新理论构建方向。
The dynamic ownership arrangements surrounding the venture capitalist–entrepreneur (VC–E) relationship inherent in new ventures make the examination of principals’ or venture capitalists’ (VCs) and agents’ (entrepreneurs) governance arrangements interesting to explore. This article examines the limitations of agency theory and then stewardship theory in explaining the behaviors of individuals in the VC–E relationship. Our analysis points out the potential problems inherent in each theory's explanatory ability as it relates to the VC–E relationship. Lastly, theoretical gaps in the VC–E relationship are discussed along with suggestions for new theory surrounding this important and intriguing relationship.