Owner Tenancy as Credible Commitment under Uncertainty
研究了房东在维修成本不确定时如何通过业主自住向租客传递可信承诺，模型预测部分自住楼租金更高，并用办公楼数据验证了这一结论。
How do landlords provide credible signals to tenants that they will maintainthe building when the needed upkeep over the contract period is uncertain at the time that rental decisions are made? In this paper, we develop a model of credible commitment under uncertainty wherein owner tenancy serves as the commitment signal to the market. In comparing completely tenant‐occupied (absentee landlord) to partially owner‐occupied buildings, the model predicts that in the latter case, the equilibrium rent is higher. We test this prediction using rental data for a sample of office buildings, some of which are completely tenant‐occupied while others are partially owner‐occupied. The results indicate that, as predicted by the model, rents are significantly higher when landlords can signal a commitment to high‐performance standards.